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The study of people’s behaviors during different economic climates 
is now a serious field of study—just look at newly minted Nobel Prize 
winner Richard H. Thaler’s research in behavioral economics.1 The U.S. 
economy will likely produce ample research material for Mr. Thaler in the 
coming years because of its 3% increase in gross domestic product and its 
0.4% increase in personal income—numbers that are just a snapshot of the 
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2017 third quarter.2 With these promising numbers, Americans are able to 
change their relationships with money: “now that we’re seeing some 
income growth, broad based across the economy, people are moving the 
needle on savings in a way we haven’t seen in a while.”3 Now that the time 
for saving is here, the focus shifts to finding a successful method to do so. 
A novel approach has emerged in seventeen states: domestic asset 
protection trusts (DAPTs).4 
DAPTs are self-settled spendthrift trusts that allow the settlor to 
retain a beneficial interest in the trust while removing it from the reach of 
future creditors.5 These trusts are irrevocable with an “independent trustee 
who has absolute discretion to make distributions to a class of beneficiaries 
which includes the settlor. The primary goals of DAPTs are asset 
protection and, if so designed, transfer tax minimization.”6 
The history of authorizing DAPTs spans decades and has slowly 
crept from the west coast to the east coast. After two states seemed to 
support DAPTs in statutory terms, Alaska enacted the first operational 
statute in 1997.7 During the two proceeding decades, nineteen states have 
authorized some form of revised statute or act supporting DAPTs.8 A 
settlor now has the option of settling funds in one of seventeen domestic 
jurisdictions or choosing to put money in one of the many offshore 
jurisdictions available.9 
By instinct, the choice seems easy—why not keep your money down 
the street instead of transferring it to the Cayman Islands?10 A local bank 
does not pose the same apparent risks as transferring your money outside 
of the country.11 The decision is not as simple as it should be because of 
                                                     
 2. BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP’T OF COM., https://www.bea.gov/ [https://perma 
.cc/FL2K-AEVV]. 
 3. Anna Bahney, Americans are Saving (a Little) More, CNN: MONEY (June 20, 2017), 
http://money.cnn.com/2017/06/20/pf/emergency-fund/index.html [https://perma.cc/3XUJ-2CC4]. 
 4. David G. Shaftel et al., Eleventh Annual ACTEC Comparison of the Domestic Asset Protection 
Trust Statutes, ACTEC (Aug. 2017), http://www.actec.org/assets/1/6/Shaftel-Comparison-of-the-
Domestic-Asset-Protection-Trust-Statutes.pdf [https://perma.cc/M5A3-GTAN]. 
 5. Wesley D. Cain, Note, Judgment Proof: Can Connecticut Residents Insulate Assets from 
Creditors Using a Delaware Domestic Asset Protection Trust?, 47 CONN. L. REV. 1463, 1463 (2015). 
 6. Shaftel et al., supra note 4, at 1. 
 7. Id. 
 8. See id. DAPT friendly states include: Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, Michigan, Mississippi, 
Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, 
Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Id.  
 9. See Matthew Russo, Comment, Asset Protection: An Analysis of Domestic and Offshore Trust 
Accounts, 23 MICH. ST. INT’L L. REV. 265, 279–91 (2014). 
 10. See Henry J. Lischer, Jr., Domestic Asset Protection Trusts: Pallbearers to Liability?, 35 
REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 479, 515 (2000) (stating the palpable advantages of avoiding foreign 
jurisdiction due to different languages, political and legal structure, and currency). 
 11. See Paul M. Roder, Note, American Asset Protection Trusts: Alaska and Delaware Move 
“Offshore” Trusts onto the Mainland, 49 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1253, 1257 (1999). 
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each state court’s uncertainty surrounding the novel trusts.12 Counsel is 
less likely to suggest a strategy that has not been reviewed by a court, as 
counsel would be unable to ensure its effectiveness for their client. 
It took fifteen years for a court to contemplate the efficacy of 
DAPTs.13 The Washington bankruptcy case, In re Huber, involved a 
Washington settlor who created a self-settled trust under Alaska law.14 The 
case was decided on a choice of law question, with the trial court 
concluding that Washington law, not Alaska law, governed when deciding 
the validity of the Alaskan trust.15 By applying Washington law, the court 
pronounced that the trust violated Washington’s public policy against self-
settled trusts, thereby rendering the trust void.16 
Nonetheless, the tides in favor of DAPTs have taken a turn with the 
holding of Klabacka v. Nelson. Correspondingly, through the lens of this 
favorable ruling, this Note will address why DAPTs should be regarded as 
an effective method of protecting a settlor’s money and argue for more 
states to follow suit. More specifically, this Note will describe why the 
Klabacka case came to the correct holding because of public policy 
sentiment and economic jurisdictional competition. 
First, this Note illustrates that the Klabacka case mercifully 
establishes a clear test for the efficacy of DAPTs. Notably, this is the first 
case to reach the efficacy question and provides an attractive template for 
succeeding states. Second, this Note demonstrates that the Klabacka case 
was decided correctly because current public policy favors the use of 
DAPTs.17 There are already similar, legitimate techniques available to 
protect assets that are not against public policy, so it follows that public 
policy favors DAPTs. For instance, homestead exemptions18 and tenancy 
                                                     
 12. Generally, domestic asset protection trusts offered less shelter in comparison to offshore 
trusts. See Robert T. Danforth, Rethinking the Law of Creditors’ Rights in Trusts, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 
287, 309–10 (2002) (comparing common characteristics of offshore trusts and contemporary trust law 
and determining that a multitude of problems exist in domestic asset protection trusts as opposed to 
their offshore counterparts). 
 13. DAPTs were first introduced in 1997 via Alaska statute, yet the first court case appeared 
fifteen years later in Washington. Shaftel et al., supra note 4, at 1; Waldron v. Huber (In re Huber), 
493 B.R. 798 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2013). 
 14. Waldron, 493 B.R. at 807–09. 
 15. Id. at 808–09. In general, choice of law doctrine determines which laws apply to any given 
case. When the case has some connection to multiple jurisdictions, a court can either apply the law of 
the forum state or the law of the location of transaction giving rise to the litigation. See generally 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
 16. Waldron, 493 B.R. at 809. An illegal trust is one that is contrary to a statute, public policy, 
or morality. Illegal Trust, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 17. See discussion infra Section III. 
 18. A homestead exemption shelters a certain amount of a home’s worth from property taxes. 
See Property Tax Homestead Exemptions, INST. ON TAXATION & ECON. POLICY (2011), 
https://itep.org/property-tax-homestead-exemptions/ [https://perma.cc/3WMU-2868]. 
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by the entirety19 currently permit individuals to legally protect their assets 
from creditors.20 In essence, DAPTs have an unfair negative stigma when 
considering the other asset protection vehicles seemingly in-line with 
public policy. 
Furthermore, Klabacka’s favorable holding of these principles may 
summon transformation on a macro scale, including an advantageous 
impact on interstate federalism.21 Particularly, this Note emphasizes that 
encouraging settlors to create DAPTs celebrates the fiscal advantages of 
interstate federalism—especially the economic significance of interstate 
competition. 
Through the above-mentioned grounds, this Note will champion the 
holding in Klabacka, exclaiming it should be the standard for deciding the 
efficacy of future DAPTs. Thus, Part I briefly outlines the development of 
trust law, from the beginning of trusts to the emergence of domestic asset 
protection laws. Part II summarizes the facts, reasoning, and holding of 
Klabacka v. Nelson. Part III analyzes Klabacka in relation to domestic 
asset protection trusts generally, stressing the lack of direction in this field, 
the clear need for certainty, and the benefit of establishing a test. Part IV 
contends that courts should appreciate the benefits of these trusts not only 
for the settlor and beneficiary, but also for states and the country. A short 
conclusion will follow. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Basics of Trust Law 
To understand the public policy fueling DAPTs and the Klabacka 
holding, it is important to understand trust law at large in the United States. 
The most basic description of a trust is an explanation detailing a three-
party fiduciary affiliation relating to property; the first party transfers the 
legal title upon the second party for the benefit of the third party.22 Often 
the second party, the trustee, manages the property with full independence, 
                                                     
 19. Tenancy by entirety only involves jurisdictions allowing the protection of property from the 
creditors of one spouse. See Tenancy by the Entirety, CORNELL L. SCH.: LEGAL INFO. INST. (Apr. 21, 
2018, 9:47 PM), https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/tenancy_by_the_entirety [https://perma.cc/GU68-
ZQXU]. 
 20. See John K. Eason, Policy, Logic, and Persuasion in the Evolving Realm of Trust Asset 
Protection, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2621, 2668 (2006). 
 21. See generally Alexander B. Shiffman, The Domestic Asset Protection Trust and Its 
Federalism Implications, 13 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 853 (2015). 
 22. See Trust, BUS. DICTIONARY (Apr. 21, 2018, 2:27 PM), http://www.businessdictionary. 
com/definition/trust.html [https://perma.cc/2RNM-KSN4]. 
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while the third party, the beneficiary, is permitted to receive payments 
from the trust income or corpus.23 
American law deals with the attempt to manipulate conduct after 
death, commonly referred to as “dead hand” control, differently than its 
English predecessor.24 American trust law placed a higher level of 
deference to the testator, allowing for more control after death than its 
English counterpart.25 A primary example of this control is the spendthrift 
trust.26 A spendthrift is used for the purposes of shielding the trust body 
while granting the beneficiary trust income distributions.27 Settlors 
favored the idea of giving a gift in installments (versus a lump sum to be 
squandered immediately) but sought to protect the gift from the 
beneficiary’s creditors.28 The spendthrift offers the supreme protection of 
wealth: protection from a frivolous beneficiary and shelter from the 
beneficiary’s powerful creditors.29 
In its simplest explanation, a spendthrift trust is a trust that 
incorporates specific clauses that bar the beneficiary from freely 
dissipating their interest but also prevent attachment by creditors.30 A 
creditor may attach to the assets when a trust distribution has occurred but 
cannot take out a lien on the trust or pierce the trust veil.31 
The general acceptance of spendthrift trusts in the United States owes 
a debt to two cases in the 1800s.32 Over time, the vast majority of the state 
governing bodies and courts have recognized the efficacy of spendthrift 
                                                     
 23. See JESSE DUKEMINIER & ROBERT H. SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 70, 385 (9th 
ed. 2013). 
 24. Because of public policy, dead hand control is limited, specifically by the rule against 
perpetuities. See Deadhand Control, CORNELL L. SCH.: LEGAL INFO. INST. (Apr. 21, 2018, 8:10 PM), 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/deadhand_control [https://perma.cc/SKL2-RRJW]. 
 25. Id. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE 
TRANSFERS § 10.1 (AM. LAW INST. 2003) (“The controlling consideration in determining the meaning 
of a donative document is the donor’s intention. The donor’s intention is given effect to the maximum 
extent allowed by law.”). 
 26. N. Camille Varner, Is The Dead Hand Losing Its Grip in Texas?: Spendthrift Trusts and In 
Re Townley Bypass Unified Credit Trust, 62 BAYLOR L. REV. 598, 599 (2010). 
 27. Id. at 69498. 
 28. GERRY W. BEYER, EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS: WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 376 (6th 
ed. 2015). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Lischer, supra note 10, at 485. One such attachment by creditors that is authorized occurs 
when there have been fraudulent transfers or if the creditor is part of a special class that the beneficiary 
is legally bound to support. Russo, supra note 9, at 282, 277. 
 31. Kellsie J. Nienhuser, Comment, Developing Trust in the Self-Settled Spendthrift Trust, 15 
WYO. L. REV. 551, 555 (2015). 
 32. See generally Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U.S. 716 (1875); Broadway Nat’l Bank v. Adams, 133 
Mass. 170 (1882). 
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provisions.33 The policies supporting the validity of spendthrift provisions 
are that the settlor has the right to dispose of property as they please; the 
public will not be burdened by insolvent beneficiaries; and creditors have 
the duty to investigate the settlor’s finances and should know well enough 
to not use the trust when calculating credit lines.34 In this day and age, 
spendthrift provisions are accepted in all fifty states.35 As time wears on, 
the edges of these laws are slowly carved out through deliberation on 
specific issues.36 I consider one of the most provocative of these issues 
arises from a self-settled spendthrift trust. 
B. Self-Settled Spendthrift Trusts’ History 
As explained above, most jurisdictions accept the idea of a 
spendthrift provision. However, spendthrift trusts created by the settlor 
and for the settlor’s benefit are not as widely accepted.37 Some 
jurisdictions find that if a fraction of beneficial interest is held for the 
settlor of the trust, the instrument is considered void.38 The policy 
consideration for this rule is a concern that property owners could shelter 
their money for their own needs without being required to pay back or 
mislead creditors.39 Courts recognized well-intending property owners 
hoping to provide for a beneficiary with creditor protection, while at the 
same time acknowledged the likelihood of property owners wishing to 
“protect themselves against their own profligacy, at the expense of their 
creditors.”40 Creditors rely on the debtor’s apparent income and could be 
misled into believing the debtor is financially stable based on the trust, 
only to find out the settlor has no other assets outside of the shelter of the 
trust.41 In contrast, the argument has been made that a 
                                                     
 33. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5801.04(B) (West 2016); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:9–11 
(West 2016); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 166.010–180 (2016); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. TIT. 18–B § 105(2)(E) 
(2016); ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.110 (2015). 
 34.  BEYER, supra note 28, at 377.  
 35. See HALENE S. SHAPO, GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW 
OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 222, at 420 (3rd ed. 2007) (compiling numerous spendthrift provisions 
in all fifty states, along with their exceptions). 
 36. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 23, at 697 (“The policy debate in contemporary 
times has shifted to the question of whether to make exceptions for certain classes of creditors, such 
as spouses and children or tort victims.”). These exceptions are the main focus of the holdings in 
Klabacka v. Nelson and Toni 1 Tr., by Tangwall v. Wacker, to be discussed later. 
 37. Cain, supra note 5, at 1470. 
 38. Id. 
 39. See Erwin N. Griswold, Spendthrift Trusts Created in Whole or in Part for the Benefit of the 
Settlor, 44 HARV. L. REV. 203, 203–04 n.1 (1930). 
 40. Stewart E. Sterk, Asset Protection Trusts: Trust Law’s Race to the Bottom?, 85 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1035, 1044 (2000). 
 41. See GEORGE T. BOGERT, TRUSTS 155–56 (6th ed. 1987). 
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creditor that was going to lend money to somebody, usually took a 
look at what they owned. When they looked at somebody who may 
have a self-settled or had spendthrift trust, they know as a creditor 
they would not be able to touch those assets so they did not lend, 
based on those assets.42 
However, self-paternalism was considered to be more beneficial than 
the costs of allowing self-settled spendthrift trusts.43 The only option for 
settlors seeking asset protection to the highest extent was to gamble by 
creating a spendthrift trust with the beneficiary as someone other than the 
settlor.44 That is, until the 1980s rolled around and numerous offshore 
jurisdictions began attracting trust business with an inventive technique: 
the self-settled asset protection trust.45 These foreign jurisdictions enacted 
legislation that determined that judgments rendered by overseas courts 
were non-enforceable against the suite of trust parties: settlors, 
beneficiaries, and self-settled trusts.46 Some estimates indicate that more 
than one trillion dollars sit in offshore jurisdictions under asset protection 
trusts.47 
C. Emergence of Domestic Asset Protection Trusts 
In 1997, Alaska was the first state to introduce a self-settled asset 
protection statute.48 This law condoned the formation of irrevocable trusts 
that made distributions to a class of beneficiaries allowing allocations to 
the settlor.49 Delaware followed suit later that same year, stating that it 
“intended to maintain [its] role as the most favored domestic jurisdiction 
                                                     
 42. See Hearing on A.B. 469 Before the S. Comm. on Judiciary, 1999 Leg., 70th Sess. 7 (1999) 
(statement of David Goldwater, Assem. Dist. 10, Southern Nev.), https://www.leg.state.nv.us 
/Division/Research/Library/LegHistory/LHs/1999/AB469,1999.pdf [https://perma.cc/56TF-KN9X]. 
 43. See, e.g., Ariz. Bank v. Morris, 436 P.2d 499 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1969) (declaring that fairness 
counterpoised the possible benefits for the settlor); Pitrat v. Garlikov, 947 F.2d 419, 424 (9th Cir. 
1991) (“The image of a wise and benevolent person seeking to provide for a foolish and impulsive 
loved one supersedes the values which generally require that creditors be able to have access to 
debtors’ assets and allows for spendthrift trusts. However, this image of benevolent paternalism is 
absent when the settlor of the trust is also the beneficiary.”) (citations omitted). 
 44. See Abusive Trust Tax Evasion Schemes—Glossary of Trust Terms, IRS, 
https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/abusive-trust-tax-evasion-schemes-
glossary-of-trust-terms [https://perma.cc/K9S8-WJG2] (defining “strawman” as the person whose 
trust receives another grantor’s assets to be passed through the original trust to a second or more trusts 
for the purpose of disguising the true identity or ownership of the assets). 
 45. See Sterk, supra note 40, at 1047–48. 
 46. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 23, at 704–05. 
 47. Ritchie W. Taylor, Domestic Asset Protection Trusts: “The Estate Planning Tool of the 
Decade” or a Charlatan?, 13 BYU J. PUB. L. 163, 164 (1998). 
 48. Shaftel et al., supra note 4, at 1. 
 49. See Alaska Stat. § 34.40.110 (1997). 
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of the establishment of trusts.”50 In recent years, fifteen states have 
followed Alaska and Delaware, allowing for self-settled asset protection 
trusts.51 Each state legislature has approached the issue differently, 
especially regarding exceptions for potentially fraudulent actions, burden 
of proof, and asset protection.52 
While these statutes have now been in existence for over twenty 
years, there are few cases litigating the nuances of the trusts they create.53 
An explanation for such a dearth of litigation is that there have not been 
any creditors or plaintiffs needing to challenge the efficacy of a self-settled 
asset protection trust—though this is quite unlikely. More likely, a settlor 
ends up paying the money owed or settles outside of court to avoid costly 
litigation. Because courts have not addressed the public policy questions, 
the edges of these laws are still obscured—it is plausible that courts would 
prefer that this inquiry took place on the legislative floor. Inquiries on 
legislative floors across the country would in turn address the primary 
issues facing these trusts. 
D. The Surety and Surplus Issue 
There are two main issues facing domestic asset protection trusts 
today: (1) enforceability and (2) the fact that only a minority of states have 
enacted them. As demonstrated through the various cases mentioned 
above, many courts are unwilling to find a DAPT enforceable. Courts have 
demonstrated a stringent adherence to presumed public policy and a 
preference to apply local laws (even in the face of explicit contrary 
language). One Utah court even held that the trust instrument was 
revocable, and thus could be attached by creditors.54 
The uncertainty posed by DAPTs is presented twofold: first, for 
attorneys who are unsure whether to advise clients to potentially use 
DAPTs and second, for settlors who are again gambling with assets 
reminiscent of the initial days of moving accounts offshore. Attorneys who 
wish to venture into DAPT use should study the current cases on record, 
always being diligent to note if there are new developments in the laws.55 
An attorney must be aware of how the courts are interpreting a particular 
state’s DAPT law, whether it is the participating state establishing 
                                                     
 50. ROBERT H. SITKOFF & JESSE DUKEMINIER, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 713 (10th ed. 
2017) (citing Synopsis of Qualified Dispositions in Trust Act, H.B. 356, 139th Gen. Assemb., 71 Del. 
Laws 452 (1997)). 
 51. Shaftel et al., supra note 4, at 1. 
 52. See generally id. 
 53. Shaftel et al., supra note 4, at 1. 
 54. See, e.g., Dahl v. Dahl, 345 P.3d 566, 579–81 (Utah 2015) (holding that the instrument was 
a revocable trust, instead of a domestic asset protection trust, based on language in the document). 
 55. See Shaftel et al., supra note 4, at 1. 
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precedent or supportive theory for advancing a current law. As always, the 
final advice for attorneys is to avoid implementation errors, ensuring that 
the case is decided on its merits and not scriveners’ error. Yet, all this 
advice does not remedy the actual problem: attorneys lack certainty 
regarding how a court will rule on any given DAPT case. This insecurity 
surely stagnates the use of a potentially massively beneficial legal tool for 
Americans. 
The surety question surrounding DAPTs was recently clarified to an 
extent with the holding in the Alaska Supreme Court case Toni 1 Trust, by 
Tangwall v. Wacker.56 The court held it could not limit the scope of 
another court’s jurisdiction over fraudulent transfer action against a 
DAPT.57 Specifically, the court held that “the Full Faith and Credit Clause 
does not compel states to follow another state’s statute claiming exclusive 
jurisdiction over suits based on a cause of action ‘even though [the other 
state] created the right of action.’”58 
The trust in question was established in Alaska, a DAPT-friendly 
state, but held Montana property, where DAPTs are not accepted.59 With 
this holding there is hardly a theory about how a DAPT would protect 
assets against the creditors of the settlor in non-DAPT states. The court’s 
holding more clearly defines a contour of DAPT interpretation and 
handling. On one hand, this case adds needed precedent to a scarce area of 
law. On the other hand, the holding may not show an enthusiastic 
acceptance of DAPTs that the Klabacka holding had signaled.60 Perhaps 
establishing comprehensive DAPT law will be like walking in sand: two 
steps forward and one step back. 
Additionally, few American jurisdictions have approved DAPTs.61 
Only the minority of states allowing DAPTs means that clients may not be 
receiving the best possible asset protection. Clients assume their attorney 
is striving to provide the best strategy—and yet perhaps one of the best 
                                                     
 56. See generally Toni 1 Tr., by Tangwall v. Wacker, 413 P.3d 1199 (Alaska 2018). 
 57. Id. at 1203. 
 58. Id. at 1204 (citing Tenn. Coal, Iron & R. Co. v. George, 233 U.S. 354, 360 (1914) (emphasis 
added)). 
 59. Id. at 1201. 
 60. Professional sentiment about this case is that it may not truly add to the contours of DAPT 
law. The transfers to the trusts occurred after the claims against the defendants had already arisen, 
therefore the fraud exemption clearly renders the trust void. Furthermore, because the defendant was 
subject to personal jurisdiction in a non-DAPT state, the assets are subject to administration by that 
state. These are simple fraud-on-creditor and personal jurisdiction issues, not a DAPT efficacy issue. 
See generally Jay Adkisson, Alaska Supreme Court Hammers Last Nail in DAPT Coffin for Use in 




 61. See Shaftel et al., supra note 4, at 1. 
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strategies is an elusive one because the courts and legislatures are 
unwilling to budge on their stance. Most importantly, however, a lack of 
favorable jurisdictions means that there is intensely concentrated interstate 
competition among these jurisdictions.62 A lack of DAPT jurisdictions 
means that seventeen states hold a monopoly on trust assets, simply 
because they are willing to shield the trusts in a novel way.63 
If courts and legislatures could resolve the enforceability questions 
and promote DAPTs as a new trust option, the United States could see an 
astonishing rise in trust formation and in turn, marketplace competition. 
The benefits of these two solutions would affect the individual settlor and 
the state.64 
II. THE KLABACKA V. NELSON DECISION 
A. Case Brief 
The Klabacka opinion may be the first case to marshal in the benefits 
of DAPTs because it not only established the novel concept of trust 
efficacy, but it also addressed the public policy questions head-on.65 The 
case involved a married couple, Eric and Lynita, each represented by 
separate counsel, who signed separate property agreements that converted 
all their assets from community property into separate property in 1993.66 
In 2001, the couple placed their respective property into self-settled 
spendthrift trusts, which were governed by Nevada law.67 The couple’s 
divorce proceedings began in 2009.68 The district court “equalized the two 
[self-settled spendthrift trusts] so as to pay Eric’s personal obligations and 
                                                     
 62. See Daphne A. Kenyon, Theories of Interjurisdictional Competition, NEW ENGLAND ECON. 
REV., Mar.–Apr. 1997, at 14. 
 63. Six of the ten most popular states for trusts include those with DAPT statutes. The Ten Most 
Popular States for Trusts, WEALTHMANAGEMENT.COM (Dec. 18, 2018), https://www.wealth 
management.com/estate-planning/ten-most-popular-states-trusts [https://perma.cc/JA94-D8KX]. 
 64. See infra Part III. 
 65. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 59 (AM. LAW INST. 2003) (“Spendthrift Trusts: 
Exceptions for Particular Types of Claims. The interest of a beneficiary in a valid spendthrift trust can 
be reached in satisfaction of an enforceable claim against the beneficiary for (a) support of a child, 
spouse, or former spouse; or (b) services or supplies provided for necessities or for the protection of 
the beneficiary’s interest in the trust.”); Greg Crawford, Klabacka vs. Nelson Sets Precedent for Asset 
Protection in Nevada, ALLIANCE TR. CO. OF NEV. (Aug. 14, 2017), https://alliancetrust 
company.com/news/nevadas-unparalleled-asset-protection/ [https://perma.cc/28YE-Z3BS]; Howard 
M. Zaritsky, Court Sustains Domestic Asset Protection Trust Against Claims for Spousal and Child 
Support, 29 PROB. PRAC. REP., No. 7, 2017, at 1, 4. 
 66. Klabacka v. Nelson, 394 P.3d 940, 943 (Nev. 2017). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Crawford, supra note 65. 
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also awarded Lynita a lump sum alimony award against Eric’s Trust—not 
Eric in his personal capacity.”69 
Each of the trusts had a spendthrift clause, prohibited attachment by 
any future creditor, and listed Nevada residents as initial distribution 
trustees.70 Further, each grantor held the right to veto any distribution; was 
the investment trustee of his or her trust; held all rights as a trustee, other 
than the power to make or direct distributions; and required that the 
distribution trustee provide ten days’ notice of any impending 
distribution.71 “The respective settlors, however, in the capacity of also 
being an ‘investment trustee,’ retained the power to hold and manage the 
investments of the respective trust.”72 
The court held that the trusts were valid DAPTs because the terms of 
the writing manifested an intention that the assets be protected from the 
claims of the beneficiaries’ creditors, which is all that is required under 
Nevada law.73 The law in question lists out an unambiguous test as to 
whether a DAPT is valid, entailing that it must (1) be in writing, (2) be 
irrevocable, (3) not require that any part of the trust’s income or principal 
be distributed to the settlor, and (4) not be “intended to hinder, delay or 
defraud known creditors.”74 
The court relied heavily upon the legislative history of Nevada’s 
DAPT statute.75 The court confirmed that Nevada does not have exception 
creditors, including spouses and dependent children in a domestic dispute, 
and expressly rejected the position given in section 59 of the Restatement 
(Third) of Trusts.76 The court reiterated: 
The legislative history explicitly mentions child support as an 
example of a debt that would not be free from attachment if known at 
the time the trust was created. However, the trust assets would be 
protected from attachment as to debts unknown at the time the trust 
was created—presumably, this protection extended to child-and 
                                                     
 69. Thomas Greene, Supreme Court Case Reinforces Nevada as #1 DAPT Jurisdiction, LIBERTY 
ST. ADVISORY GRP. (May 11, 2017), https://www.libertystreetadvisorygroup.com/supreme-court-
case-reinforces-nevada-1-dapt-juridiction/ [https://perma.cc/VEN4-2HBR]. 
 70. Zaritsky, supra note 65, at 4. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Edward D. Brown, Domestic Asset Protection Trust Not Obligated to Pay Spouse’s Alimony 
and Child Support, DAVIS SCHILKEN L. BLOG (June 6, 2017), http://dslawcolorado.com/domestic-
asset-protection-trust-not-obligated-pay-spouses-alimony-child-support/ [https://perma.cc/7AVG-
TK2P]. 
 73. Zaritsky, supra note 65, at 5. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Klabacka v. Nelson, 394 P.3d 940, 951 (Nev. 2017). 
 76. Shaftel et al., supra note 4, at 22. 
1570 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 42:1559 
spousal-support obligations unknown at the time the trust was 
created.77 
Understanding that the Nevada state law seeks to protect the assets 
of a valid spendthrift trust against any court order, the court ensured the 
efficacy of the DAPTs.78 
The Klabacka holding is unique for three reasons. First, the case had 
favorable facts that forced the court to decide the efficacy issue; there were 
no choice of law questions and the fraudulent transfer question was easily 
defeated.79 Second, after the Nevada court took the bait, it established an 
unambiguous test for valid DAPTs, providing case law in favor of these 
trusts—supplying attorneys with ammunition for their arguments in future 
litigation. Finally, Nevada’s legislation is distinctive in its DAPT 
friendliness.80 The Klabacka decision sprang from Nevada’s unique 
friendliness towards DAPTs. 
B. Legislative History Authority 
A review of Nevada’s legislative history on DAPTs shows the blunt 
considerations when passing the statute on spendthrift trusts. Three main 
considerations were discussed when deciding how pro-DAPT the state 
would be: the benefit to Nevada, the protection for the settlor, and the 
likelihood of child support issues arising in the future.81 First, the 
discussions explicitly state that the reasoning for such a settlor-friendly 
law is to “increase estate tax revenue and attract assets to Nevada by 
providing benefits to very wealthy persons.”82 Nevada Assemblyman 
David Goldwater stated that when “the trust was domicile in Nevada and 
the person was a resident of Nevada, Nevada got the benefit of all their 
inheritance tax.”83 It is clear that Nevada stands to profit on multiple 
revenue levels by allowing such trusts to be established within its 
                                                     
 77. Klabacka, 394 P.3d at 951 (internal citation omitted). 
 78. Zaritsky, supra note 65, at 6. 
 79. Klabacka, 394 P.3d at 947. 
 80. Id. at 951. 
 81. See generally Hearing on Assemb. B. 469 Before the Assemb. Comm. on Judiciary, 1999 
Leg., 70th Sess. (Nev. 1999) [hereinafter Hearing 469], https://www.leg.state.nv.us/ 
Division/Research/Library/LegHistory/LHs/1999/AB469,1999.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q2CW-K3DG]; 
Hearing on Assemb. B. 378 Before the S. Comm. on Judiciary, 2013 Leg., 77th Sess. 6 (Nev. 2013) 
[hereinafter Hearing 378], https://www.leg.state.nv.us/Session/77th2013/Minutes/Senate/JUD/Final 
/1035.pdf [https://perma.cc/4VLS-RXHM]. 
 82. Hearing 469, supra note 81, at 2. 
 83. Id. at 6. 
2019] Domestic Asset Protection Trusts 1571 
borders.84 In other words, “DAPT friendly laws are just one example 
of . . . attraction-incentivized policy making.”85 
Second, Mr. Goldwater stated that spendthrift trusts “offered 
protection to wealthy people just as the committee was often fighting for 
the rights of the poor . . . . Wealthy people deserved rights as well.”86 He 
continued on by saying that the “problem of becoming extremely wealthy 
was it becomes impossible to insure against that liability.”87 These frank 
statements demonstrate the concerns that specific attorneys who need to 
employ these asset protection tools have: preserving their clients’ wealth 
in as many ways as possible. 
Finally, a later committee fully examined the absence of creditor 
rights for child support against these trusts.88 A committee member said 
the group needed to “determine if we want to allow an individual to 
support himself or herself with a large sum of money held in a spendthrift 
trust and not pay child or spousal support, thereby requiring the taxpayers 
to support the children or spouse through the welfare system.”89 This is by 
far the strongest argument against such a settlor-friendly statute: the fear 
of disadvantaging special creditors such as children. The public policy 
rationale is that “a beneficiary of a trust should not be able to evade support 
obligations by hiding behind a spendthrift clause. The needs of the 
beneficiary’s ex-spouse and children are deemed to outweigh the rights of 
the settlor to control the use of trust property.”90 
In response, Senator Justin C. Jones said that his experience was that 
“self-settled spendthrift trusts are sophisticated and require counsel to set 
up. I am not sure the children or spouse of someone who has one of these 
trusts would end up on welfare. An individual should be allowed to set up 
an estate plan as he or she sees fit.”91 The Senator made an appealing 
argument for individual choice and was further bolstered by another 
committee member asserting that when “a trust is properly set up and does 
not have a fraudulent conveyance, one-half to two-thirds of an individual’s 
assets are outside of the trust. A trust is not set up so the individual is 
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essentially indigent because all of his or her assets have been placed in 
trust.”92 The rebuttal to the public policy opposition is therefore 
extinguished under the reasoning that the creditors will still have access to 
the majority of the settlor’s assets and should not be able to pierce the trust 
veil unless fraud is proven. 
Finally, the committee was informed that many states are no longer 
observing special classes of creditors to pierce the trust veil: 
The trend in the various states is to remove the exception creditors. 
Utah removed these exception creditors and does not allow either to 
access the trust. Wyoming does not allow a divorcing spouse to 
access a trust. It has a special type of trustee that can be drafted into 
the document to allow for not accessing child support out of the trust. 
Virginia and Oklahoma only allow child support as an exception. 
Colorado does not allow either exception. South Dakota recently 
enacted legislation to not allow either exception unless it was already 
a debt before the transfer to the trust. Enactment in this area has been 
progressive, and other states are trying to match Nevada.93 
It is clear that Nevada’s legislature deliberated on the benefits and 
possible detriments establishing themselves as a DAPT friendly 
jurisdiction. Ultimately, it instituted a unique statute heavily favoring the 
trusts, concluding that the opportunity for fraud and misuse would be 
minimal.94 The state’s legislature recognized the advantages that DAPTs 
offered: those which this Note argues could be emulated in other 
jurisdictions across the country. 
III. THE MACRO ANALYSIS OF KLABACKA 
There are generally two positive consequences to allowing DAPTs 
and using the Klabacka holding as a template for states to mimic: public 
policy and economic theory of interstate federalism. Each will be 
discussed below, followed by an analysis of how these concepts resolve 
the existing surety and scarcity issues facing DAPTs.  
A. Public Policy 
Time and again our country has demonstrated a progressive approach 
to public policy; being flexible enough to change with the eras.95 Trust law 
is no exception. Prior to 1997, not a single state explicitly allowed 
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domestic asset protection trusts.96 Fast forward to now and seventeen 
states allow these instruments, with additions as recent as March 2017.97 
This Note contends that more states should, and will, recognize the various 
public policy benefits by allowing DAPTs. 
The first convincing policy argument for DAPTs is that the concept 
is already widely accepted under a myriad of asset protection options that 
provide almost duplicate benefits as DAPTs; for instance, there are 
creditor-proof retirement accounts for employees.98 Scholars commonly 
assert the rebuttal against these asset protection opportunities due to their 
unwillingness to “allow debtors to leave their debts unpaid and still enjoy 
an extravagant lifestyle.”99 But there are already enacted vehicles which 
even scholars affirm are unsettling, such as tenancy by the entirety, family 
limited partnerships, limited liability companies, homestead exemptions, 
life insurance policies, annuity contracts, and transfers to close 
individuals.100 
A supreme benefit of DAPTs is they would offer security to business 
owners from legal liability.101 Considering that in 2010 the average outside 
litigation expense for a single company to litigate was $115 million,102 
reduced liability is a significant incentive. Additionally, in the same year, 
small businesses had to pay out eighty-one percent of the costs for 
litigation, but only saw twenty-two percent of the settlement revenue.103 
Domestic asset protection trusts could combat draining small businesses 
of capital through frivolous tortious claims, currently causing them to pay 
$35.6 billion of these costs out of their own coffers.104 Happily, the checks 
on businesses abusing these asset protection vehicles are already in place, 
such as fraudulent conveyance statutes.105 In theory, if small business 
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owners are able to shield their assets from legal liability, they will be able 
to drip these assets into the local economy, benefiting the community at 
large.106 
The next public policy argument in favor of DAPTs is the benefit the 
United States would see economically. As stated previously, it is estimated 
there are billions, if not trillions of dollars in wealth going to offshore 
accounts.107 If this money was kept in the United States, the country’s 
economy would benefit through attorney fees, financial advisors 
employed, possible tax revenue, etc.108 Finally, there is the potential 
extinction of costly litigation with foreign jurisdictions, saving money for 
all parties involved.109 And of course, the courts could limit the fraudulent 
activity if the accounts are within jurisdictional reach and better clarify the 
edges of this nuanced area of law. 
B. Competition Among States 
Another benefit of normalizing DAPTs in the United States is the 
recognition of the constitutional foundation of these accounts and the 
economic advantage of interstate federalism. Setting the boundaries of a 
court’s sovereignty, the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution 
allows the application of one state’s law over another.110 This clause of the 
Constitution states that full faith and credit “shall be given in each State to 
the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.”111 
Simply put, every state has its own laws, but no state’s laws are more 
important or better than another’s. 
When questioning DAPTs through the lens of interstate federalism, 
it must be asked: what should states be doing according to the Constitution, 
and also, is what they are doing benefitting the country? When looking at 
the Constitution, it is clear that each state is a sovereign (Full Faith and 
Credit Clause); that every citizen is treated equally, no matter the state they 
are from or currently in (Privileges and Immunities Clause); and that the 
states cannot erect trade obstructions (Commerce Clause).112 The 
Constitution promotes a competitive, capitalistic model between states.113 
And competition is one of the most basic motivations stimulating 
behavior, and even helps to explain fundamental theories such as 
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evolution.114 In an almost poetic way, DAPT legislation is an excellent 
model of evolution, demonstrating that survival is based on the struggle 
over limited resources. 
Enacting statutes and obtaining certain holdings in the courts proves 
Charles Tiebout’s research from the 1950s.115 Tiebout’s research was the 
catalyst that produced two theories: (1) interstate competition compels 
local representatives to grasp the true effects of their policies, and (2) 
interstate competition results in a supreme distribution of goods, services, 
and laws throughout the locality.116 An intriguing and analogous example 
is the competitive results that occurred in state legislatures for legalizing 
marijuana and gay marriage.117 This shows the economic benefits—no 
matter if the idea is seen by some as controversial—of endorsing interstate 
competition between states.118 
The last question to ask is whether enacting DAPT statutes will even 
benefit citizens. It is difficult to say precisely how much an individual and 
state will profit from such action, but a similar circumstance has been used 
to illustrate the changes in profits when a state changes its estate or 
property laws.119 The increase in profits due to changes in these laws are 
predictive of what trust law reformation could do because each of these 
laws are highly intertwined and are typically used simultaneously to 
achieve an overall legal plan for a client. The same clients that drove up 
profits in the other fields of law would be those doing the same for trust 
law. 
Professors Schanzenbach and Sitkoff looked at the economic 
changes in several states after ending the rule against perpetuities.120 The 
findings of the study showed there was a trust asset increase of as much as 
twenty percent—more than six billion dollars.121 Another way to look at 
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it: average individual accounts grew by at minimum $200,000.122 It is 
unsurprising that professional groups, such as attorneys and accountants, 
saw an increase in trust business—a demonstrated example of the benefits 
that drip down throughout the state’s economy.123 In reflecting on their 
findings, the professors mused that “jurisdictional competition in trust law 
appears ready to focus next on [D]APTs.”124 
DAPTs and federalism could have a symbiotic relationship—each 
helping to stimulate the other. The federalist action of “racing to the top” 
would improve DAPT law and efficacy, while the establishment of DAPTs 
would promote strong competition among states, economically and 
statutorily.125 The questions have been asked and answered: acceptance of 
DAPTs would benefit the individual citizen, stimulate the distinct state’s 
economy, and uphold the traditions embedded in the United States’ 
Constitution. 
CONCLUSION 
It seems fitting that this Note would open and close with economic 
studies speaking to the topic at hand. The start of the discussion was the 
anticipation of individuals seeking a protection option for newfound 
wealth. The conclusion shows that the novel shelter approach of domestic 
asset protection trusts can benefit the individual, the local community, the 
state, and the country. First, however, internal struggles must be resolved 
for DAPTs to truly shine. Advisors need to be sure of their advice, 
knowing that they have the courts and law on their side when 
recommending these asset protection vehicles. The Klabacka case 
provides the ideal policy template for attorneys to, at minimum, bolster 
their arguments in favor of a valid DAPT. Furthermore, legislatures now 
have the Klabacka bright-line test to duplicate in their own legislation. 
By debunking the timeworn ideas that public policy disfavors 
DAPTs and adding confidence to promote them, it is the hope of this Note 
that a path of clarification and surety should follow after Klabacka. As 
noted, DAPTs are supported by the Constitution, federalism, and 
economic studies. The time for domestic asset protection trusts as a 
common planning tool is now. All that states and courts have to do is usher 
in the Klabacka era. 
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